National Reconnaissance Support to the Army (Paperback)
This unclassified study evaluates the intelligence support the Army received from national intelligence agencies during JUST CAUSE and the Gulf War by using the seven characteristics of intelligence quality found in Joint Pub 2-0. The new national military strategy anticipates a lessdefined threat than during the Cold War. Also, downsizing pressures will proportionately reduce national and service intelligence support to the combatant CINCs and the services. This situation will require the Army to rely more than ever on national reconnaissance to support its warfighting intelligence needs.A review of the Gulf War and JUST CAUSE indicates that although national intelligence has the capability to answer many tactical and operational reconnaissance questions, it generally fails to do so. The reasons are that national intelligence is focused to serve senior government policy makers not warfighters. National intelligence products are often caveated by differing analytic assessments that in effect are either ill-suited or cause confusion for tactical commanders. Finally, joint doctrine did not clearly set out coordination procedures or the process by which national reconnaissance is transmitted to tactical users in a timely manner.